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Despite vigorous research on risk communication, little is known about the social 
forces that drive these choices. Erev, Wallsten, & Neal (1991) showed that forecasters 
learn to select vague or precise risk estimations as a function of what best serves the 
group’s collective interests. This study extends the notion and further investigates 
whether evaluation apprehension contributes to the selection of the risk expressions. 
We hypothesize that group size and public feedback can engender apprehension and 
affect the learning of risk communication. Experiment 1 reproduced Erev et al.’s 
(1991) results and in addition showed that forecasters in small groups learned the 
optimal mode faster than those in larger groups. Experiment 2 contrasted social 
versus personal feedback and showed learning was faster in the personal feedback 
condition. 
 





Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 




Professor Thomas Wallsten, Chair 
Professor Michael Dougherty 
Professor Kent Norman 







 I would like to thank all committee members, Drs. Thomas Wallsten, Mike 
Dougherty, and Kent Norman, for their helpful comments and numerous changes 
made on earlier drafts. The final product is regrettably unable to demonstrate the full 
extent of their insights and careful suggestions. More importantly, they agreed to 
discuss my proposal within one week, which showed true dedication to graduate 
students. I would also like to thank Robyn Zakalik for resolving the problems with 
withdrawing research funds needed to pay the participants, a process that still very 
much baffled me to this day. 
iii  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Acknowledgements         ii 
List of Tables iv 
List of Figures         v
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION          1




Stimulus, Materials, and Procedure……………………………………...4
Results: Forecast Mode as a Function of Trial Block…………………...8





Stimulus, Materials, and Procedure……………………………………13
Results……………………………………………………………………14
Discussion………………………………………………………………..15
CHAPTER 3: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 16





List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Mean Slope Coefficients as a Function of Second-Order 
Payoff and Group Size in Experiment 1…………………………….20 
 
Table 2: Stepwise regression analysis predicting the linguistic  
Preference…………..……………………………………………….21  
 
Table 3: Mean Slope Coefficients as a Function of Second-Order 
 Payoff and Feedback in Experiment 2………………………………22  
 
v
List of Figures 
Figure 1:  A Sample Spinner in the Experimental Design……………………...23 
 
Figure 2:  Decision Sheet for Participant 1 in Large Group condition....………24 
 
Figure 3:  A: Proportion of precise terms used (± SE) as a function of trial blocks 
in the homogeneous payoff condition in Experiment 1. B: Proportion 
of precise terms used (± SE) as a function of trial blocks in 
heterogeneous payoff condition in Experiment 1..………… …….....25 
 
Figure 4:  Proportion of optimal terms used (± SE) as a function of trial blocks 
across both payoff conditions in Experiment1…..…………………..26 
 
Figure 5:  Mean of Precise Estimates Used as a Function of Averaged Second-
Order Payoff of the Same Group on the Previous Trial Block in 
Experiment 1 …………………………………………………….….27 
 
Figure 6:  Decision sheet in Experiment 2…………………..………………….28 
 
Figure 7:  A: Proportion of precise terms used (± SE) as a function of trial blocks 
in the homogeneous payoff condition in Experiment 2. B: Proportion 
of precise terms used (± SE) as a function of trial blocks in 
heterogeneous payoff condition in Experiment 2…………………....29  
 
Figure 8: Proportion of optimal terms used (± SE) as a function of trial blocks 
across both payoff conditions in Experiment 2……………………...30
1
Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
Literature on risk communication has stressed the role the public places on trust 
and reputation of the communication source (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). 
Conversely, the form of the communication affects the trust placed in the 
communicator. For example, Gurmankin, Baron, and Armstrong (2004) found that 
patients put more faith in physician’s diagnoses conveyed in numerical than in verbal 
terms. The bidirectional relationship between how risk information is communicated 
and the reputation of the source is an important issue to understand.  
 The focus of this research is to understand how forecasters choose to communicate 
risk information to others in the group. Absent from the literature on the linguistic 
preference of uncertainty communication is research on motivational factors behind 
the use of probabilistic estimates. Recognizing this shortcoming, Erev, Wallsten, and 
Neal (1991) suggested that in group contexts forecasters may select their 
communication modes in a manner that best serves society as a whole. They designed 
an experiment inspired by the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), in which 
individuals acting in their own self-interest collectively hurt or destroy their society. 
Markets (e.g., for stocks or futures) fail when everyone thinks that the same action is 
in his or her favor (e.g., everyone wants to sell). Conversely markets thrive when 
people prefer heterogeneous courses of action (some choose to buy and some to sell). 
Erev, Wallsten, and Neal (1991) asked whether forecasters (Fs) would select 
language that would induce heterogeneous or homogeneous behavior by decision 
makers as a function of what best served their group. To answer this question, they 
designed a study with two different payoff conditions. In one everyone in the group 
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received a payoff when decision makers made the same (correct) choice and in the 
other condition everyone received a payoff when at least one decision-maker made 
the correct choice. In addition to possible group winnings, decision-makers won 
individual amounts when they were correct. Erev, Wallsten, and Neal (1991) assumed 
that (1) decision-makers make choices that they believe maximize their personal 
chances of winning and (2) individuals differ to a greater degree in interpreting verbal 
than numerical probabilities. On that basis they predicted that Fs would learn to give 
verbal judgments when heterogeneous behavior served the group’s best interests 
(decision-makers acting in their self interest would make different choices, depending 
on their interpretations of the verbal terms) and numerical judgments when 
homogeneous behavior best served the group (all decision-makers would make the 
same, most likely choice). In fact, that is exactly how the data turned out. This finding 
suggests that forecasters do learn to adjust their precision of communication in 
response to group payoffs. However, drawing from the literature on group decision-
making, we believe that impression management is also an important consideration to 
members of the same group. Ariely and Levav (2000) showed that decision-makers 
made sequential decisions based in part on how they would be perceived by others, 
oftentimes to the detriment of their personal satisfaction. The field experiments 
conducted by Ariely and Levav (2000) shared many similarities with the paradigm 
used by Erev et al. (1991). The most important feature was that people in the same 
group faced the same decision-making task, and that decision was made sequentially.  
 If people do indeed worry about how they appear to others in the group, then they 
will be motivated to avoid negative evaluations by acting in any way that can be 
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construed as erroneous by members of their social group (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987), a 
process known as evaluation apprehension. Evaluation apprehension is a feeling of 
arousal that curtails an individual’s learning and performance when the individual is 
aware of the fact that his or her performance is being monitored. We hypothesize that 
people in salient roles such as communicating risk judgments are susceptible to such 
a process. However, the extent of the process depends on the size of the group 
(Green, 1991). Latané and his colleagues (Latané, 1981; Latané & Hawkins, 1976) 
proposed a social impact model according to which feelings of apprehension within a 
group of similar status people increased as a function of group size. As a 
consequence, performance declined with group size. Similarly, people learned more 
effectively from their prior failures and mistakes when they were alone as compared 
to in the presence of an evaluative audience, and the reduction in the level of 
performance was the result of the evaluative anxiety caused by the bystanders and co-
actors (Seta & Hassan, 1980; Seta, Seta, Donaldson, & Wang, 1988). 
 Social impact model suggests evaluation apprehension arise when audience size 
grows, which is detrimental to learning and performance. Base on this logic, we 
hypothesize that the rate of development and convergence of risk communication 
pattern among group members is inversely related to group size. Specifically, group 
size moderates the rate of communication convergence, with increased size 
decreasing the rate of convergence, due to a heightened sense of evaluation 
apprehension.
4
Chapter 2: Method 
Experiment 1
Participants 
 A total of 171 participants from University of Maryland served in this study in 
exchange for monetary reward and course credit. Sixty participants served in groups 
of size 3 (small groups) while the remaining 111 served in groups of 5 or 6 (large 
groups). One group of 6 was excluded from the analysis due to violation of 
experimental protocol on communication. 
 Design 
 The study was a 2 (group size: small v. large) x 2 (payoff condition: heterogeneous 
v. homogeneous) x 10 (blocks of trials) mixed design with repeated measure on the 
last factor. Group members took turns serving as forecaster, decision-makers, and in 
the large group as bystanders. Thus, on every trial, regardless of group size, there was 
one forecaster and two decision-makers. Decision-makers individually won $0.15 for 
each correct decision they made based on the judgments communicated by the 
forecaster. In addition to this first-order payoff, the decision-makers and in the large 
group the bystanders (but not the forecaster) received second-order payoffs according 
to which payoff condition they were in. In the homogeneous condition, decision-
makers and bystanders earned the second-order payoff of $0.10 each whenever both 
decision-makers made the correct decision. In the heterogeneous condition, they 
received the second-order payoff as long as at least one decision-maker made the 
correct decision. A trial block was completed after everyone in the group had served 
as forecaster. The session continued for a total of 10 blocks. 
 Stimulus, Materials, and Procedure 
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Participants were seated around a large table with sufficient space between them 
that they could not see the decision form that each had in front of him or her. Two 
cubicles with computers and linked monitors opened to the room that housed the 
table. We first distributed written instructions describing the procedure and the payoff 
mechanism and then demonstrated them on the computer. Then, each participant 
received a number in a clockwise fashion. These numbers were written on a 
whiteboard so that a public record of each forecaster’s performance could be kept. At 
this point we describe the procedure for the small groups only. The participant who 
received the number 1 (P1) started the experiment as an forecaster while P2 and P3 
served as decision-makers. On the first trial, P1 entered a separate cubicle to observe 
stimuli on the monitor and to make forecasts on the basis of them; only the forecaster 
had access to the stimuli. The experimenter monitored the stimuli (and the decision-
makers) from the other cubicle to make sure that forecaster followed the instructions 
correctly and did not intentionally mislead the decision-makers such as selecting 
terms that did not appear on the screen.  
 The stimuli consisted of various spinners radially divided into three colored 
sectors, red, blue, and yellow (see Figure 1). The three colors were named below the 
spinner and eight probability terms, four numerical and four verbal, were arrayed 
below each color name. All numerical values were chosen from the integer values in 
the range of ± 2 from the actual proportion of the color on the spinner. Vague 
descriptors were selected from a list of phrases that appeared in Mosteller and Youtz 
(1990), in which the authors surveyed 20 studies and tabulated the numerical 
averages of opinions on quantitative meanings of 52 probabilistic expressions. We 
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made a few changes to their list: first, we changed adverbs to adjectives; second, we 
deleted the two double negatives on the list (e.g. not unreasonable); leaving 50 terms 
available for this study. To reflect the wide individual differences that exist in 
interpreting verbal phrases, the four verbal phrases describing each color were 
randomly sampled from all available terms that were within the range of ± 20
percentage points from the actual proportion of each color as found in Mosteller and 
Youtz (1990). The placement of verbal and numerical terms on screen was 
counterbalanced; half of the spinners had verbal descriptors listed before the 
numerical estimates, while other half had the opposite placement.  
 The decision forms had 30 numbered lines corresponding to the 30 trials of the 
session, each with RED, BLUE, and YELLOW written on it. Upon seeing the spinner 
on the monitor in the cubicle, forecaster selected one estimate for each color and 
called it out so that decision-makers could circle the color on the appropriate line of 
the decision form (Figure 2) that they believed the spinner would most frequently 
land on out of 6 spins. Then, forecaster clicked the left bar marked “Click to spin” 
and told the decision-makers the color the spinner landed on, forecaster repeated this 
spin procedure for a total of 6 times. Decision-makers then wrote down the number of 
times the color they selected came up in the 6 spins. For each correct response, 
decision-makers accumulated $0.15 for themselves plus the amount of second-order 
payoff, determined by the payoff condition that Ps were in (homogeneous v. 
heterogeneous). The second-order payoff accumulated on that trial was a public 
record, recorded on the board next to the forecaster’s assigned number. Finally, the 
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trial ended when forecaster clicked the bar marked “Click for the next spinner” before 
exiting the cubicle. 
 The next trial started when P2 took the role of forecaster while P1 and P3 served 
as decision-makers. P2 repeated the same procedure as described above and then P3 
took over the role of forecaster to begin the third trial. The process was repeated 30 
times and every three trials made a trial block, totaling 10 trial blocks. Similar 
spinners appeared in each block save for slight changes in each color’s proportion on 
the circle (± 5 percentage points).  
 In groups with sizes 5 and 6, the procedure was identical except that a role of 
bystander was added. The order was designed so that decision-makers were always 
the next two members after forecaster, followed by the bystanders. For example, on 
trial 1, P1 began the experiment serving as forecaster, P2 and P3 became decision-
makers, while P4 to P6 (or P5 in groups of size 5) all took the role of bystanders. For 
the next trial, P2 became the forecaster and P3 and P4 were the decision-makers, etc. 
The role of bystander was added to keep the number of decision-makers constant 
across the size manipulation. Bystanders took no action but they received the same 
second-order payoff as did the decision-makers. Each trial block here was composed 
of 6(5) trials if there were 6 (5) members in the group, resulting in a total of 60 (50) 
trials for the whole experimental session.
At the end of the experiment, a true lottery was conducted using a bingo cage to 
determine the 2 trials that would count for cash payoffs. The payoff was the sum of 
personal winning earned when serving as decision-maker plus the second-order 
payoff on the trial selected for payment. In addition to the winnings from 
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participation, participants in the heterogeneous condition could win an additional $1 
plus extra course credit if they finished first in earning, to reduce the possibility of 
collusion between participants. 
 Results: Forecast Mode as a Function of Trial Block 
 Our unit of analysis is groups, not individuals and our focus is on the proportions 
of numerical and verbal forecasts provided by Fs. We hypothesized that the use of 
precise estimates would increase in the homogeneous payoff condition and decrease 
in the heterogeneous, and furthermore, that the rates of change would be greater in the 
small than in the large group. Figure 3 showed the mean proportion of numerical 
forecasts as a function of trial block in each of the four group size-payoff condition 
combinations. Qualitatively, the effects all appear to be as predicted.  
 To assess the effects statistically, we fit separate linear and quadratic functions for 
each group to the scatter plot of proportion of numerical estimates as a function of 
trial block. The quadratic functions did not provide significantly better fits than the 
linear. Further, a 2 (group size) x 2 (payoff)  x10 (trial block) mixed analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) using the residuals from the linear fit for each group at each trial 
block as the dependent variable also revealed no systematic effects (all F’s < 1.28, all 
p’s > 0.24). Hence, we used the slopes and intercepts of the linear functions as the 
dependent variables for subsequent group by condition analyses. Although our main 
interest is in the slopes as measures of rates of change, we first checked for any initial 
bias in the groups’ linguistic choices by performing a 2 x 2 between-group ANOVA 
on the intercepts. No factors were significant (all F’s < 1).  
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Next, we submitted the slopes to a 2 (group size) X 2 (payoff) ANOVA. There was 
a significant effect due to payoff [F(1, 35) = 31.27, η2 = .47, p < .001] as well as a 
payoff by group size interaction [F(1, 35) = 5.04, η2 = .13, p < .04]. We followed up 
the interaction with simple t-tests comparing groups within payoff conditions (Table 
1). For participants in the homogenous payoff condition, the linear increase in the use 
of numerical estimates as a function of time was more pronounced in the small group 
(M = .14, SE = .03) than in the large group (M = .06, SE = .02) and the difference was 
significant (t(18) = 2.27, p < .04). In the heterogeneous condition, the linear decrease 
in the small group (M = -.07, SE = .03) was also more pronounced than in large group 
(M = -.03, SE = .02; t(17) = -1.03, n.s.), although the difference was not significant. 
 To highlight our main hypothesis that rate of learning the optimal communication 
mode is inversely related to group size we recoded the data to show the number of 
optimal communication mode choices in each trial block. We then fitted a linear 
function for each group to the scatter plot of proportion of optimal mode of choices as 
a function of trial block to obtain the slope for the dependent measure in a 2 x 2
between-group ANOVA. As predicted, the results showed that group size was the 
only significant factor ((F(1, 35) = 4.74, η2 = .12, p < .04). Figure 4 displays the 
mean proportion of optimal forecast mode choices as a function of trial block for both 
group sizes across payoffs. 
 Results: Sensitivity to the Payoffs of Others 
For this analysis, we linearized the data in the same manner as before, except that 
the slopes and intercepts in this analysis came from regressing the proportion of 
numerical estimates used by all Fs in the current trial block as a function of the 
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averaged second-order payoff accumulated by decision-makers in the previous trial 
block. Figure 5 showed the proportion of numerical estimates used in the current trial 
block conditioned on the second-order payoff of the previous trial block for all 
groups. A 2 (payoff) x 2 (group size) ANOVA with the slopes from the linearized 
data as the dependent variable showed that main effects confirmed our hypothesis that 
forecaster’s were affected by the performance in others: Payoff condition was 
significant, F(1, 35) = 7.40, η2 = .15, p <.02, showing that winnings from the prior 
trial affected subsequent forecaster’s selection of a vague or precise expression. The 
group size factor was not significant (F < 1, n.s.), nor was its interaction with payoff, 
F(1, 35) = 3.05, p = .10.
To further analyze the effect of group on individual performance, we performed a 
step-wise regression to examine whether learning was still significant after taking the 
outcome of prior trial block into account. Specifically, we first entered the main 
experimental factors (Group Size, Payoff, and Group Size x Payoff) into the 
regression. Then, the second step included the predictors Trial block, amount of 
winning in the previous round and its interaction with Payoff and Group Size. The 
results are displayed in Table 2. All factors in the second step other than the 
interaction of Group Size and previous winnings were significant and reached the α =
.05 inclusion rule. The predictors Trial block (B = 0.22, p < .001) and prior Second-
Order Payoff (B = 1.06, p < .001) indicated a strong recency and learning effect in 




Consistent with our hypothesis, smaller groups showed a faster convergence and 
adaptation of the more advantageous form of risk communication pattern during the 
experiment than did the larger groups. The ANOVA results revealed that smaller 
groups used more precise form communication in the homogeneous payoff condition 
and more vague form when in the heterogeneous payoff condition as opposed to 
larger groups. Although the second ANOVA showed an overall group size effect on 
communication mode choice, the difference was significant only in the homogeneous 
payoff condition.  
 Erev et al. (1991) posited that the change in the precision of risk communication 
had a strong learning component as time progressed. However, evaluative 
apprehension predicts that Fs were also likely to be affected by the second-order 
payoff earned by their group. ANOVA revealed that forecaster’s were influenced by 
the second-order payoffs received by the group. The regression analysis confirmed 
our ANOVA results in that monetary gains from the previous trial significantly 
influenced Fs’ subsequent use of precise communication choices. Taken together, 
forecasters were sensitive not only to the structure of the group payoffs, but also to 
the outcomes attributed to the previous forecaster. This is consistent with previous 
research showing that social comparison heightens evaluative apprehension inside a 
group (Harkins, 1987; Leary, 1986), which is detrimental to performance.           
 Zajonc’s (1965) social facilitation theory posits that the feeling of apprehension is 
expected when the task an individual has to perform is new. On the other hand, the 
presence of evaluator and audience can improve performance if the task he or she is 
required to perform has already been mastered. The social facilitation theory predicts 
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that the presence of others can produce the arousal needed in social facilitation. 
Moreover, Zajonc (1980) asserted that the feeling of arousal is generated by the 
presence of any active evaluator or audience, especially when they are also 
performing the same task. This effect is known as the coactor effect which further 
shows that having to compare personal performance with others can result in poor 
performance.  
 It can be argued that the results in Exp. 1 are caused by competitive drive instead 
of evaluation apprehension. In our design, the co-actors performed risk forecasting, 
which allowed them to compete against one another for best results. Seta, Paulus, and 
Schkade (1976) found that individuals in big groups instead of small groups 
experienced poorer performance when engaged in competitive behavior. In light of 
this, we wish to test if the presence of co-actors can still reduce the adoption of 
optimal risk communication mode when there is no objective way for individuals to 
monitor the performance of others.  
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that forecasters adopted the optimal mode of 
communication more slowly in larger groups even though doing so would confer a 
bigger payoff to the entire group. The forecaster’s decision was also influenced by the 
results attributable to the previous forecaster, and this effect is accentuated in larger 
groups. The current experiment manipulates whether the second-order payoff 
information is social or personal. As discussed previously, social facilitation 
engenders evaluation apprehension when performance comparison is possible. This 
may muddle the interpretations in Exp.1 as the poorer performance in large group 
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could be attributed to competition amongst group members instead of social 
facilitation. Experiment 2 manipulated the availability of the second-order payoff 
information to group members to test this possibility. If adoption of optimal 
communication mode is due to social facilitation, then the removal of payoff 
information from social groups should increase the proportion of precise terms used 
in the homogeneous payoff condition and decrease the proportion of precise terms 
used in the heterogeneous condition. If it is due to competition, then the reverse 
should occur. Specifically, we hypothesize that the payoff and its interaction with the 
availability of feedbacks should affect communication mode choices, with the 
direction of the interaction depending on the social pressure at work.  
 Participants 
 A total of 117 participants from University of Maryland served in 39 triads in 
exchange for monetary rewards and partial course credit.  
 Design 
 
The study was a 2 (payoff: homogeneous v. heterogeneous) x 2 (feedback: social 
v. personal) x 10 (trial blocks) mixed design with repeated measure on the last factor. 
 Stimulus, Materials, and Procedure 
 Participants received the same stimuli and materials as those in the Experiment 1. 
The second-order payoff manipulation remained the same as in Experiment 1. The 
feedback condition manipulated the availability of information regarding the second-
order payoff winnings. In the personal feedback condition, only the forecaster 
received information on second-order earnings whereas all P’s have the information 
in the social feedback condition, as described in Experiment 1. We kept the second-
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order earnings by recording the second-order earnings personally on the forecaster’s 
decision sheet under the column marked “Forecaster Correct” (Figure 6). Each P had 
access only to the second-order payoff on trials in which he or she served as 
forecaster.  
 Results 
 Figure 7 shows the mean proportion of precise forecasts as a function of trial block 
in each of the four feedback-payoff condition combinations. As before, we fitted a 
linear function for each group to the scatter plot of proportion of numerical estimates 
as a function of trial block to obtain the intercept and slope. Table 3 summarizes the 
mean slope coefficients in the feedback and payoff condition. An initial ANOVA 
performed on the intercept found neither independent variable to be significant (all 
F’s < 1.91). Then, a separate ANOVA using slope as the dependent variable found no 
main effect of feedback (F(1, 35) = 2.00, n.s.), but a significant effect of payoff 
condition (F(1, 35) = 20.40, η2 = .37, p < .001) and a significant interaction between 
feedback and payoff, (F(1, 33) = 4.79, η2 = .12, p < .04). We then performed simple 
t-tests comparing groups within payoff conditions. For participants in the 
homogenous payoff condition, the linear increase in the use of numerical estimates as 
a function of trial block for those in the social feedback (M = .05, SE = .03) and those 
in the personal feedback (M = .07, SE = .02) was not significantly different (t(17) = -
.59, n.s.). In the heterogeneous condition, the linear decrease was greater in the 
personal feedback (M = -.13, SE = .03) than in social feedback (M = -.02, SE = .03)
and the difference was significant, t(16) = 2.38, p < .03.
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To highlight our main hypothesis that feedback affected the rate of learning the 
optimal mode of risk communication, we recoded the data to show the number of 
optimal communication choices in each trial block. We then fitted a linear function 
for each group to the scatter plot of proportion of optimal mode of estimates as a 
function of trial block to obtain the slope for dependent measure. As predicted, a 2 x
2 between-group ANOVA showed the feedback condition was the only significant 
factor ((F(1, 33) = 4.74, η2 = .13, p < .04). Figure 8 shows the mean proportion of 
optimal mode of forecasts as a function of trial block for the both feedback conditions 
across payoffs. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, we tested whether eliminating group access to the information 
about second-order winnings can improve forecaster’s communication. As predicted, 
the payoff and its interaction with feedback condition were both significant, 
suggesting that forecaster’s were less worried about their performance when there 
was no basis for comparing their performance to that of the others.                
 Zajonc’s (1965) social facilitation theory predicts that the level of performance 
drops when a person is confronted with a task that others are doing at the same time. 
On the other hand, the presence of evaluators and audience facilitates and improves 
individual performance if the task he or she is required to perform has already been 
mastered. This powerful theory has been replicated and observed in many contexts 
(for review, see Green, 1991) but never in risk communication. In Experiment 2, we 
found partial support for evaluation apprehension in risk communication as the 
forecaster adapted to the optimal mode of communication when feedback was 
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masked. However, this effect was significant only in the heterogeneous payoff 
condition.  
Chapter 3: General Discussion and Conclusion 
 Experiment 1 was designed to manipulate one’s sense of evaluation apprehension, 
but the design did not allow us to rule out the possibility that performance was driven 
by a desire to compete. Experiment 2 tested that possibility by contrasting the effects 
of social and personal feedback on the rate of learning the optimal mode of 
communication. The results supported our hypothesis that evaluation apprehension 
could detract one from learning the optimal mode of risk communication as 
demanded by the payoff contingency.   
The pattern of our results suggests that evaluation apprehension due to social 
facilitation had a negative affect on the formation of linguistic preferences. In 
Experiment 1, we demonstrated that the rate of learning the optimal mode of 
communication was higher when fewer members were affected and in Experiment 2, 
we showed that personal feedback was more effective in helping forecaster’s to learn 
to communicate risk information than was public feedback. Because members of the 
same social group had strong interest in maintaining positive images, the adoption of 
a beneficial form of risk communication was predictably lower in conditions where 
evaluation apprehension was heightened, as in the case of large groups or the 
availability of the information on the performance of other members. 
 Following the position of by Fox and Irwin (1998) that the social contexts under 
which the uncertainty and risk communication take place should be experimentally 
examined, we studied the effects of social payoff (homogeneity v. heterogeneity in 
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choices) and social comparison on the formation of the risk communication pattern. 
In Experiment 1, the size of the group had a negative impact on a forecaster’s ability 
to adopt the optimal mode of communication called for by a payoff condition. 
Experiment 2 extended the finding by showing that presence of an audience can be 
made less detrimental when social feedback is muted.  
 Duval & Wicklund (1972) proposed that the presence of others can cause an 
individual to focus more on personal performance and this leads to heightened 
awareness of personal performance and the ideal performance one wishes to obtain, 
which, in turn, can cause a decrement in performance (Liebling & Shaver, 1973; 
Gibbons, 1990). The data we obtained appear to be inconsistent with the self-
awareness account. The ANOVA and step-wise regression analyses in Experiment 1 
showed that individual’s risk communication pattern was influenced by the amount of 
second-order earnings made by other members in the group, suggesting that 
forecasters in Experiment 1 compared personal performance against same group 
members instead of focusing on how to achieve ideal performance forecasters had set 
for themselves. 
 The negative effect of audience is not restricted only to evaluative bystanders. 
Butler and Baumeister (1998) had found that a supportive audience could also cause a 
decrement in an individual’s performance when the criterion of performance was set 
high. In studies on home-field advantage, Schlenker & Leary (1982) found that 
supportive audiences made self-presentation need more salient thereby intensifying 
the level of self-focused attention. In a similar vain, Tesser and others (Tesser & 
Campbell, 1982; Tesser, Campbell, & McIntosh, 1989) found that supportive 
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audiences made performer felt more scrutinized than non-supportive audience. In 
short, past literature suggests that the presence of others can reduce individual’s level 
of performance when the results of performance can be checked. 
 Further Issues and Future Directions 
 Evaluation apprehension posits that the presence of coactors or evaluators is 
detrimental to an individual’s performance if the task is new. However, it does not 
distinguish whether the apprehension stems from forecasters worrying about their 
own poor performance or about the good performance achieved by others in the same 
group. Past research on self-serving bias has found that when individuals had to 
compare their performance to that of others, they rated their personal performance 
more favorably rather than denigrating the others’ performance. This effect was 
magnified when performance feedback was not produced after participants finished 
their task (Klein, 2001). The results were consistent with prior works on the effect of 
audience size on evaluation (Paulus & Cornelius, 1974; Paulus, Shannon, Wilson, & 
Boone, 1972; Seta & Hassan, 1980) in that the performers in front of bigger audience 
tried harder to avoid poor performance than those with a smaller audience. Taken 
together, past results suggest that forecasters in our study were probably more 
concerned about how personal performance was being judged by coactors than trying 
to match performance achieved by other coactors. Future studies should explicitly 
manipulate the standards of performance and accessibility of feedback on 




Approaches in risk communication research in the past have been decidedly 
cognitive. While the cognitive approach has highlighted some fundamental 
differences in the numerical and verbal presentation of probabilistic events, it has 
ignored the context under which risk communication takes place, that is, in groups. In 
the group context, communicators have to consider not only their own 
communication preference, but also those of others. In medical situations, numerical 
presentation is the preferred mode of communication for the patient, and the 
physician’s failure to take the patient’s preference into consideration can result in 
poor decision-making on the part of the patient and an increased mistrust in the 
physician (Gurmankin, Baron, & Armstrong, 2004). We think the current research 





Table 1. Mean Slope Coefficients as a Function of Second-Order Payoff and Group 
Size in Experiment 1
Group Size 
Group Payoff Small Group Large Group 
Homogeneous .14 .06 
Heterogeneous -.07 -.03 
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Table 2. Stepwise Regression Analysis Predicting the Linguistic Preference in 
Experiment 1
R2 Beta F change 
First step 
Payoff 
 Group Size 











Payoff x Trial Block 






F (4. 343) = 47.87** 
 
Note.  Payoff = Second-order payoff, homogeneous v. heterogeneous. Winning = 




Table 3. Mean Slope Coefficients as a Function of Second-Order Payoff and 
Feedback in Experiment 2
Feedback 
Second-Order Payoff Personal Social 
Homogeneous .07 .05 
Heterogeneous -.13 -.02 
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Figure 2. Decision Sheet for Participant 1 in Large Group Condition 
 
Trial Role Participant 1 Correct Trial Role  Correct 
1 Forecaster   31 Forecaster   
2 Bystander   32 Bystander   
3 Bystander   33 Bystander   
4 Bystander   34 Bystander   
5 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  35 Decision-
Maker 




Blue     Red      Yellow  36 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  
7 Forecaster   37 Forecaster   
8 Bystander   38 Bystander   
9 Bystander   39 Bystander   
10 Bystander   40 Bystander   
11 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  41 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  
12 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  42 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  
13 Forecaster   43 Forecaster   
14 Bystander   44 Bystander   
15 Bystander   45 Bystander   
16 Bystander   46 Bystander   
17 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  47 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  
18 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  48 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  
19 Forecaster   49 Forecaster   
20 Bystander   50 Bystander   
21 Bystander   51 Bystander   
22 Bystander   52 Bystander   
23 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  53 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  
24 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  54 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  
25 Forecaster   55 Forecaster   
26 Bystander   56 Bystander   
27 Bystander   57 Bystander   
28 Bystander   58 Bystander   
29 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  59 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  
30 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  60 Decision-
Maker 
Blue     Red      Yellow  
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Figure 3.  A: Proportion of precise terms used (± SE) as a function of trial blocks in 
the homogeneous payoff condition in Experiment 1. B: Proportion of precise terms 





Figure 4.  Proportion of optimal terms used (± SE) as a function of trial blocks across 




Figure 5. Mean of Precise Estimates Used as a Function of Averaged Second-Order 




Figure 6. Decision sheet in Experiment 2 
 
Trial Individual Correct # Correct? Forecaster Correct 
1 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct:  
2 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
3
1
Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
4 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
5 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
6
2
Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
7 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
8 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
9
3
Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
10 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 




Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
13 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 




Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
16 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 




Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
19 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 




Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
22 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 




Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
25 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 




Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
28 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 




 Blue   Red   Yellow Correct: 
29  
 
Figure 7. A: Proportion of precise terms used (± SE) as a function of trial blocks in 
the homogeneous payoff condition in Experiment 2. B: Proportion of precise terms 





Figure 8.  Proportion of optimal terms used (± SE) as a function of trial blocks across 
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